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ABSTRACT 
Feminists have effectively challenged the dominant Enlightenment epistemology by demonstrating that knowledge and power are 
always intimately connected, and that Enlightenment claims to truth have excluded other knowledge claims. Feminist empiricism, 
standpoint, and postmodernist epistemologies are explored for their contributions to the development of my own epistemological 
position. 
RESUME 
Les feministes ont defie de facon efficace I'epistemologie dominante du Siecle des Lumieres en ddmontrant que la connaissance et 
le pouvoir sont relies etroitement, et que les pretentions sur la veritd qu'a le Siecle des Lumieres exclue les autres pretentions sur la 
connaissance. L'empirisme feministe, le point de vue, et les epistdmologies post-modernistes sont etudiees pour les contributions qu'ils 
ont apportees au development de ma propre position 6pistemologique. 
How do we know what we know? How do 
we know about others' experiences? How do we 
know that what we know is accurate and true? 
Since the eighteenth century, the answers to these 
and other epistemological questions have usually 
been based in logic and reason, influenced by the 
philosophy of the Enlightenment. In recent times, 
feminists and postmodernists are among those who 
have challenged aspects of modern Western 
scholarship that are rooted in Enlightenment 
thinking. Such challenges are part of what seems to 
be a fundamental transformation in Western 
philosophy and culture (Flax 1987). 
My explorations of feminist 
epistemologies arose out of my own questioning of 
how I could make knowledge claims. As a graduate 
student in community health, I wondered how I 
could claim to know about poverty-related health 
and food issues for women whose lives are very 
different than mine. My reading in feminist 
literature was inspired by a qualitative research 
methodology course, and was particularly 
influenced by another course I was taking at the 
same time, on gender and global issues, taught by 
an anthropologist. I have written this paper in a 
"modernist" format, imposing order, 
simplifications, and a post hoc logic on large bodies 
of feminist and philosophical scholarship. My 
intention in this paper is to merely "point" to the 
literatures which have informed the development of 
my current epistemological position. I begin with 
an overview of the Enlightenment and its influence 
on the development of the natural and social 
sciences. I then explore feminist epistemological 
critiques of the Enlightenment, notably feminist 
empiricism, feminist standpoint epistemologies, and 
postmodern feminism, ending with a statement of 
my own epistemological position. 
THE AGE OF REASON AND THE 
DEVELOPMENT OF T H E NATURAL 
SCIENCES 
As Foucault (1984) explains, the 
Enlightenment, or "The Age of Reason" is: 
an event, or a set of events and complex 
historical processes, that is located at a 
certain point in the development of 
European societies. As such, it includes 
elements of social transformation, types of 
political institution, forms of knowledge, 
projects of rationalization of knowledge 
and practices, technological mutations that 
are very difficult to sum up in a word, 
even if many of these phenomena remain 
very important today. (43) 
Enlightenment philosophers elaborated a 
number of important ideas which have been central 
to the development of modern societies: freedom of 
thought and expression; critiques of religion; the 
importance of the individual; a commitment to 
social progress; and the value of reason and 
science, rather than superstition and traditional 
authority, as the way to knowledge (Abercrombie, 
Hil l & Turner 1994). The exaltation of reason and 
science was one of the central themes of the 
Enlightenment. One of the key Enlightenment 
philosophers, Immanuel Kant, "describes 
Enlightenment as the moment when humanity is 
going to put its own reason to- use, without 
subjecting itself to any authority" (Foucault 1984, 
38). Reason would dispel the tyranny and darkness 
of superstition and religion, and would lead Man to 
freedom and happiness. Enlightenment thinkers 
considered Woman to be non-rational and 
associated her with emotion and nature (Lloyd 
1996); therefore, there would be no reason, 
freedom or happiness for her! 
The Enlightenment conception of reason 
owes much to the rationalist philosopher, Rene 
Descartes, who developed a new approach to the 
acquisition of knowledge, "the systematic pursuit of 
an orderly method" (Lloyd 1996, 152). The 
Cartesian method involves breaking down all the 
complicated operations involved in reasoning into 
their simplest components. Descartes believed that 
all knowledge came from reason and that anything 
else obstructed knowledge. He also believed that 
his method would lead to knowledge in all areas of 
study. In sharply delineating mind and matter, and 
thought and feeling, the Cartesian method helped to 
polarize intellect and emotion, reason and 
imagination, mind and matter as never before 
(Lloyd 1996). 
Enlightenment thinking, based on the 
Cartesian method, shaped the particular form of 
natural science that developed in the eighteenth and 
nineteenth century in the Western World. Western 
science was "... projected as a universal, value-free 
system of knowledge, which has displaced all other 
belief and knowledge systems by its universality 
and value neutrality, and by the logic of its method 
to arrive at objective claims about nature" (Shiva 
1996,280). Based on a mechanistic view of nature, 
this science is reductionist, separating objects from 
their contexts and into smaller and smaller pieces in 
the search for truth. It is based on the assumption 
that there is order in nature, waiting to be 
discovered, described and understood, and that i f 
science could only uncover this order, nature could 
be predicted and controlled. 
POSITIVISM AND THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 
Much of the history of the social sciences 
has been an attempt to be more like the 
mechanistic, reductionist, value-free model of 
natural science, a philosophical approach called 
positivism. (Ironically, some of the natural 
sciences, notably physics, have rejected this 
model.) There are four principle tenets of 
positivistic social science: there are no fundamental 
differences between the natural and social sciences; 
the aim of social science should be to derive 
scientific laws or principles that explain social 
events and describe the particular conditions under 
which those events will happen; social reality can 
be explained by what is observable and measurable; 
and social science must be value-free and therefore 
can speak only about what is and how it came to be, 
not about what ought to be (Wilson 1983). 
Positivistic social scientists wrestle with the 
unavoidable problem that unobservable inner states, 
such as values, beliefs, and attitudes, have a major 
role to play in governing human behaviour. They 
have developed a number of "solutions," such as 
the creation of "objective" numeric scales of 
measurement, in attempts to overcome this 
problem. 
In the positivistic tradition of social 
science, the researcher distances him/her self from 
the researched and remains detached and 
uninvolved from those under study. This 
perspective "... assumes that the researcher is 
objective about observing, judging and interpreting 
the life and meanings of his/her subjects" (Wolf 
1996, 4). Through story, caricature, and pointed 
analysis, Rosaldo (1993) clearly details the impact 
of practicing ethnography and cultural 
anthropology from a positivistic social theory 
framework. His tale of the Lone Ethnographer 
paints a picture of the strong, solitary, detached, 
and impartial male anthropologist living in exotic 
lands. (One can imagine the "pure science" 
counterpart of the strong, solitary, detached, and 
impartial natural scientist in his white lab coat 
searching for the Laws of Nature in his lab.) The 
Lone Ethnographer wrote "classic" ethnographies, 
portraying the cultures of other societies as 
coherent totalities of systems and patterns. 
"Ethnographies were storehouses of purportedly 
incontrovertible information to be mined by 
armchair theorists engaged in comparative studies. 
This genre seemingly resembled a mirror that 
reflected other cultures as they 'really' were" (32). 
Observations which did not fit into the system or 
pattern were considered "unanalyzable," and 
labelled "exceptions, ambiguities or irregularities." 
According to classic ethnographers, the culture and 
social structure of traditional societies existed 
independently of individuals, determining their 
personalities and consciousness. In this framework, 
traditional societies were fixed in time and did not 
change, providing a "self-congratulatory reference 
point against which Western civilization could 
measure its own progressive historical evolution" 
(31). Classic ethnographies described the cultures 
of other societies as appearing "to 'need' progress, 
or economic and moral uplifting" (31). The 
objectifying, "scientific" format of classic 
ethnography led one non-anthropologist to wonder 
"How...could such interesting people doing such 
interesting things produce such dull books? What 
did they have to do to themselves?" (Pratt 1986, 
33). 
THE FEMINIST CHALLENGE TO 
MODERN WESTERN SCHOLARSHIP 
Feminism's most powerful epistemological 
insight and challenge to modern Western thought 
has been its connection of knowledge anr1 power, 
especially the recognition that the validation of 
knowledge claims is bound up with the domination 
and exclusion of other knowledge claims (Lennon 
and Whitford 1994). Feminists share 
epistemological concerns about knowledge and 
power with other intellectual movements, such as 
Marxists and critical theorists, postcolonial 
scholars, queer theorists, radical philosophers of 
science, and postmodernists. Marginalized groups' 
critiques of modern Western scholarship and its 
underlying assumptions have centered on its 
purported value-neutrality and consequent claim 
that knowledge and power are separate; claim to 
universality; exclusion of marginal groups as 
knowers; exclusion of marginal groups as subjects 
of research, or objectification and exploitation of 
marginal groups as subjects; and distancing of the 
researcher and the researched (Shiva 1996). 
FEMINIST EMPIRICISM 
Feminist empiricism was the first feminist 
response to the sexist and androcentric biases of 
science. According to feminist empiricism, the 
sexist and androcentric natures of science are really 
just the result of "bad science" and these biases can 
be eliminated by stricter adherence to the scientific 
method. Indeed, sexist and androcentric biases in 
science must be eliminated in order to achieve the 
goal of objective knowledge. Feminist empiricists 
point out that the women's movement enabled more 
women to become researchers and that they are 
more likely than men to notice the androcentric 
biases of science and to be "unbiased" (Harding 
1991). 
As Harding (1991) points out, the 
conservatism of feminist empiricism is both a 
strength and a weakness. Feminist empiricist 
research in biology and the social sciences has 
given us a more complete or "less false" picture of 
the subjects under study and has left intact the 
conventional understanding of adequate scientific 
research. "It appears to challenge mainly the 
incomplete practice of the scientific method, not the 
norms of science themselves" (113). This has the 
advantage of making it easier for women as 
scientists to gain respect and access to funding, 
teaching and research. However, feminist 
empiricism has radical implications. First, feminist 
empiricism suggests that the context of discovery is 
important in the elimination of bias. For example, 
after the women's movement, scientists could see 
biases in their research that they couldn't see before. 
Second, feminist empiricism shows that the 
scientific method is inadequate in eliminating some 
types of bias, such as those in the identification and 
definition of research problems. Third, feminist 
empiricists have shown that some androcentric bias 
is inherent in the methods and norms of science 
(Harding 1991). The feminist empiricist recognition 
of the importance of difference, in this case, gender 
difference, undermined science claims for 
objectivity - that the knower is inconsequential to 
what is discovered and known. This has created 
tension between empiricist epistemology and its 
uses by feminists. Some feminists, interested in 
ensuring that female subjectivity left its mark on 
knowledge production, as male subjectivity had for 
generations, turned to the development of 
standpoint epistemology (Lennon & Whitford 
1994). 
FEMINIST STANDPOINT EPISTEMOLOGY 
Feminist standpoint epistemology draws 
on Hegel's reflections on the master/slave 
relationship and Marx, Engels and Lukacs' 
development of Hegel's ideas into "the standpoint 
of the proletariat," the foundation of Marxist 
theories of the operation of class society (Harding 
1993). The standpoint of the proletariat is based on 
the assertion that what we do shapes and constrains 
what we can know (Harding 1991). Feminist 
standpoint theory has two major points: that all 
knowledge is socially situated (i.e., divisions such 
as class, ethnicity, gender, and sexual orientation 
mediate an individual's understanding of reality and 
thus inform all knowledge claims), and that some 
social situations are better than others for 
knowledge production. Stratification of society by 
gender, ethnicity, class, and sexuality organizes the 
activities of those at "the top," giving them a 
distorted, ideological view of reality while those at 
the bottom of the social hierarchies are in a better 
place to understand human relationships with each 
other and with the natural world. "So one's social 
situation enables and sets limits on what one can 
know; some social situations - critically 
unexamined dominant ones - are more limiting than 
others in this respect, and what makes these 
situations more limiting is their inability to generate 
the most critical questions about received belief" 
(Harding 1993, 54-5). According to this 
perspective, male sociologists doing research on 
women are seriously handicapped because they are 
often unable to take the role of the women they 
study (Millman & Kanter 1987). 
Harding (1991) gives several reasons why 
she thinks women's standpoint research provides a 
less partial and distorted view of nature and social 
relations than conventional research: women have 
been devalued and neglected in conventional 
scientific research; are "outsiders," having been 
excluded from the design and direction of the social 
order and the production of knowledge; have less 
interest in staying ignorant about the social order 
and maintaining the status quo; struggle against 
oppression; use their experience of "everyday life" 
to formulate their perspective on the world; mediate 
ideological dualisms by transforming natural 
objects into cultural objects; are "outsiders within," 
working both "inside" and "outside" the 
conventional social order; and use the conflicting 
demands imposed on them by the social order as an 
opportunity to "see" the sex/gender system as an 
object of knowledge. 
Feminist standpoint epistemologies have 
given rise to feminist research methodologies, 
based on the principles that feminist research 
should be nonhierarchical, nonexploitive, and 
dialogical; involve researcher disclosure; and 
ensure that participants benefit from the research 
(Fonow&Cook 1991). 
CRITIQUES OF FEMINIST STANDPOINT 
EPISTEMOLOGY 
Harding's account of feminist standpoint 
epistemology (FSE) has been critiqued from a 
variety of perspectives. Her arguments are often 
essentialist. She assumes that women, by virtue of 
their gender, will recognize their oppression and the 
contradictions of their lives imposed by the social 
order, have something insightful to say about it, and 
come to feminist consciousness. She also assumes 
that the link between experience and analysis is 
unproblematic. Although the social construction of 
knowledge - that both men and women, their 
experiences, and the way they think about things 
are shaped by the society in which they live - is key 
to some of her arguments about the nature of 
science, Harding often seems to forget about the 
social construction of feminist standpoint 
epistemology. As Holmwood (1995)explains, those 
who are judged to be oppressed may not define 
themselves that way, and in fact will not if they 
have internalized the dominant ideology or if their 
identities are "fractured." I would argue that it is not 
one's social position that gives one insight into the 
social order but rather critical reflection and an 
ability to make the everyday "problematic." The 
proponents of FSE seem to want to provide a way, 
free from uncertainty, to truth, just as Descartes 
believed that his method would lead to truth. 
Lazreg (1994) argues that feminists' use of 
experience as the basis for a theory of knowledge 
positions feminist standpoint epistemology neatly 
within the empiricist school of philosophy, though 
feminist standpoint theorists don't seem to 
recognize this nor the consequent epistemological 
problems. Ironically, this brings them back to the 
epistemological territory from which they were 
trying to escape. For example, this treatment of 
knowledge accepts the Enlightenment claim that 
reason and emotion are gendered (Hawkesworth 
1989). In appealing to women's experience as the 
basis of knowledge, feminist standpoint theorists 
conflate "the disparate issues of knower and 
known," associating rationality only with men. 
Feminist philosophical inquiry finds itself in a dead 
end by focusing on knowers as the source of 
knowledge: 
The pervasive tolerance for and 
indulgence in "gender symbolism" within 
feminist discussions of epistemology 
reproduce patriarchal stereotypes of men 
and women - flirting with essentialism, 
distorting the diverse dimensions of 
human knowing, and falsifying the 
historical record of women's manifold 
uses of reason in their daily life. 
(Hawkesworth 1989, 546-47) 
Espousing standpoint epistemology 
worked well for feminists "...within the critical 
moment of theorizing. Attention to women's 
experiences'position/ perspective was able to throw 
into relief both the gaps in accepted theory and the 
masculinity of their narratives" (Lennon & 
Whitford 1994, 3). But when feminists confront 
" . . . the r e c o n s t r u c t i v e momen t in 
knowledge-production, it is less clear why the 
narratives which are produced from their standpoint 
should be considered as less distorted/more 
adequate than the masculine one" (Lennon & 
Whitford 1994, 3). As Bar On (1993) eloquently 
explains: 
A socially marginalized group does not 
have the power to exclude, silence, and 
command obedience from a dominant 
group. Its claims for epistemic privilege, 
lacking a social power on which to base 
them, cannot yield the same results as the 
self-authorizing claims of a dominant 
group and are, therefore, merely 
normative, compelling only for those who 
are theoretically persuaded by them, 
usually members of the socially 
marginalized group who find them 
empowering. Although the empowerment 
of its own members is an important goal 
for every marginalized social group, by 
claiming an authority based in epistemic 
privilege the group reinscribes the values 
and practices used to socially marginalize 
it by excluding its voice, silencing it and 
commanding its obedience to the voice of 
the dominant group. (97) 
Bar On points to a significant problem 
with FSE - that it is easily ignored and dismissed by 
those in the dominant group, men. The flip side of 
that argument is that even those men who are 
sympathetic to feminism have been "scared o f f 
feminist research by the claims to epistemic 
privilege based on women's experience, which men, 
by definition, do not share (Rabinow 1986). 
Feminist (women) anthropologists were outraged 
when an influential group of male anthropologists 
published a collection of essays (Clifford & Marcus 
1986) which considered the contributions of "the 
new ethnography," steeped in postmodernism, 
towards renewing the purpose of anthropology, 
while ignoring comparable feminist contributions 
(Behar, 1995). This may be a result of the exclusion 
of men from feminist circles. 
Another problem with FSE is that other 
dualisms fracture the gender solidarity of the 
woman's standpoint. After feminists problematized 
the experiences of men and women, some feminists 
began to wonder about the differences among 
women. Other standpoint epistemologies 
developed, based on ethnicity, sexual orientation, 
history of colonialism ("First World" versus "Third 
World"), and so on. These standpoint perspectives, 
or "epistemologies of insiderness" (Reinharz 1992, 
260) also focus on "the knower" rather than "the 
known" and echo the feminist standpoint. For 
example, Ladner (1987) states that "it is simple 
enough to say that the difference between the two 
groups - the oppressor [White people] and the 
oppressed [Black people] - prevents the former 
from adequately comprehending the essence of 
Black life and culture because of a fundamental 
difference in perceptions, based upon separate 
histories, life-styles, and purposes for being" (77). 
As a result of the "identity politics" of 
standpoint epistemologies, the challenge was on to 
determine who was most oppressed. 
When one among a multiplicity of socially 
marginalized groups is claimed to be 
epistemically more privileged than the 
others, the usual criterion for justifying 
such a claim is the extent to which the 
group in question is peripheralized. 
Epistemic privilege then becomes a 
function of the distance from the center. 
Presumably, the more distant one is from 
the center, the more advantageous is one's 
point of view. (Bar On 1993) 
Bar On describes how a lesbian writer, 
Marilyn Frye, staked a claim for lesbian epistemic 
privilege, since lesbians do not exist in "the 
conceptual schemes of phallocracies" (89). Frye's 
claim was contested by others who claimed 
epistemic privilege for lesbians "whose sexual 
practices are more transgressive than... 'vanilla' 
lesbian-feminist practices" (Bar On 1993, 89). 
(These "more transgressive" practices include 
t ranssexua l i t y , s a d o m a s o c h i s m , and 
"cross-generational" activities.) Presumably a 
"sexually transgressive" lesbian who was black, 
working class, and from the Third World would be 
most marginalized and thus be in the best place to 
understand the social world. There is no apparent 
end of "fracturing" and competition for epistemic 
privilege, and no indication of who arbitrates the 
degree of marginalization and how. 
This fracturing of identity and notion of 
the epistemic privilege of the knower has carried 
over into the political realm. Dosanjh (1996) notes 
her frustration as a feminist in the Indo-Canadian 
community in Vancouver, battling against sex 
selection. She relates that her white colleagues in 
the women's movement all shared the erroneous 
belief that sex selection is part of Indian culture: 
But certain things - and this is one of them 
- are wrong regardless of culture. It was 
frustrating and infuriating to hear, 
particularly from those whom you expect 
to be more understanding. "We can't do 
anything about this; we don't know your 
culture." It should not matter whose rights 
we are fighting for - women's rights, gay 
rights, or other minorities' rights. We must 
understand the issues and not shirk our 
responsibility by saying, "It's their issue, 
let them fight it out." We have to look 
beyond colour, gender, or race and come 
together to build a caring and just society. 
(71) 
Otherwise, those who are least powerful are bound 
to remain so. 
Reading about and reflecting on the 
identity politics of standpoint epistemologies 
helped me "name" my fear of not being able to 
justify what 1 could know about other people's 
experiences. As a white, heterosexual woman in the 
privileged position of graduate student in a highly 
industrialized country, I could share the 
"epistemological high ground" with other women of 
the homogenous "woman" category, but not with 
women whose identities and epistemic privilege 
fracture along other lines - for example, women of 
colour, lesbian women, poor women, or women 
from developing countries. If I really pushed my 
epistemic privilege, I could flaunt my small town, 
working class background. But what would that 
mean in terms of the lives I could really understand, 
and the action for social change I could join? And 
what does it mean that 1 have spent half my life 
moving away from my small town, working class 
background, and have spent the last few years in 
the very privileged position of graduate student in 
one of Canada's most prestigious universities, in its 
largest city? 
As Hekman (1997) notes, when feminist 
standpoint epistemology first emerged, it was 
exactly what was needed at the time: 
a method for naming the oppression of 
women grounded in the truth of women's 
lives.... [However], as the theory 
developed... questions of how feminists 
should theorize differences among women 
and the status of feminism's truth claims 
became impossible to ignore - and equally 
impossible to answer within the confines 
of the original theory. (356) 
On philosophical, political, and practical 
grounds, many feminists have moved away from 
standpoint epistemology's claims to epistemic 
privilege. In struggling to develop more complex 
feminist epistemological, methodological, and 
political stances, many have turned to 
postmodernism for inspiration. In the next section, 
I take up some of the interactions between 
feminism and postmodernism. 
FEMINISM AND POSTMODERNISM 
Behar (1995) characterizes feminism and 
postmodernism as "two critical projects of the 
1980s that emerged separately, like parallel lines 
destined to never meet" (3). I am not so sure that 
they were never destined to meet, since they have 
posed many of the same challenges to modern 
Western thought. Feminism and postmodernism 
started from somewhat different places: Feminism 
started from women's experiences, their oppression, 
and observations about the gendered nature of 
social structures, while postmodernism started from 
philosophical observations of the inherent problems 
of "grand narratives of legitimation," such as the 
Enlightenment story of the gradual progress of 
reason and freedom (Fraser & Nicholson 1990), in 
the face of twentieth century phenomena such as 
genocides, totalitarian regimes, the spectre of global 
nuclear destruction, and environmental 
catastrophes. In the 1990s, many feminists have 
engaged postmodernism, invigorating feminist 
theory and discussions of epistemology. Some 
feminists argue that this new feminism has arisen 
from within feminism and the contradictions of 
standpoint epistemologies; others acknowledge the 
influence of postmodernist philosophy. 
Postmodernism is not a coherent, unitary 
body of theory, but postmodern thinkers tend to 
share some common characteristics. Flax (1987) 
explains that postmodern discourses all seek to 
make us question or deconstruct taken-for-granted 
beliefs about truth, knowledge, power, the self and 
language. She lists eight modernist beliefs derived 
from the Enlightenment that are under scrutiny by 
postmodernism: 
1) The self is stable and coherent, capable 
of reasoned insight into its own processes and "the 
laws of nature." 
2) Reason provides an objective, reliable 
and universal foundation for knowledge. 
3) The correct use of reason will lead us to 
a true understanding of reality. 
4) Reason is transcendent and universal, 
existing independently of the self s bodily, temporal 
and social experience. 
5) Reason, autonomy, and freedom are 
connected in complex ways. Claims to truth and 
authority must be grounded in reason. Freedom 
consists of obeying laws that conform to the right 
use of reason. 
6) Conflicts between truth, knowledge, 
and power are overcome by reason. Truth can serve 
power without distortion and freedom and progress 
will be assured by using knowledge in the service 
of power. Knowledge can be both neutral and also 
socially beneficial. 
7) Science is the exemplar of the right use 
of reason and is therefore the paradigm for all true 
knowledge. Science is neutral in its methods and 
contents but socially beneficial in its results. 
8) Language is the transparent medium 
through which the real is represented. 
Almost all feminists agree with the core 
feature of postmodernism, a rejection of "mirror 
theories of knowledge" in which "true" knowledge 
reflects an order of being outside itself (Yeatman 
1994). According to postmodernists and many 
feminists, all knowledge is situated and partial. 
There is no way to step outside of our historically 
and socially situated conceptual frameworks or 
discourses in order to check the legitimacy of our 
interactions with reality. Postmodernist feminists 
believe that feminists: 
...have to give up the project of providing 
a totalizing theory of the nature of reality 
and recognize that we cannot unify into a 
coherent whole the multiple and diverse 
experiences which derive from the 
m u l t i p l e s i tua t ions in which 
knowledge-producers are placed. 
Fragmentation and contradictions are 
inevitable and we will not necessarily be 
able to overcome them. (Lennon & 
Whitford 1994,4) 
While some feminists have embraced 
postmodernism, others remain skeptical, and some 
are scornful of it. For example, Harding (1987) and 
Di Stefano (1990) wonder if only men can afford 
the relativism of postmodernism, since they have 
already had their Enlightenment. Mies (1996) 
considers postmodernism part of the academic 
matricide that is destroying and rewriting the 
history of feminist research. Hawkesworth (1989) 
thinks "it is a bit too cruel a conclusion and too 
reactionary a political agenda" to throw away 
reason just at the time when reason is starting to 
hold the promise of women's equality. Assiter 
(1996) states that the relativist's position - that all 
one can do is tell stories and choose the story one 
likes best - is morally and politically reprehensible 
in a world in which there are horrendous wars, 
environmental destruction, and mass starvation. 
These feminists have been repulsed by the excesses 
of postmodernism, a postmodernism which has 
overturned the "constraints and illusions" of 
modernity to embrace a relativistic nihilism and 
i n d i v i d u a l i s t i c consumerism. Such a 
postmodernism is not shared by all those who call 
themselves postmodernis ts ; however , 
postmodernism does raise fundamentally 
destabilizing questions for feminism. 
First, if, as we must, we acknowledge that 
there are many realities that women 
inhabit, how does this affect the status of 
the truth claims that feminists advance? 
Second, if we abandon a single axis of 
analysis, the standpoint of women, and 
instead try to accommodate the multiple, 
potentially infinite standpoints of diverse 
women, do we not also lose the forces of 
our argument?... If we abandon the 
monolithic concept of "woman," what are 
the possibilities of a cohesive feminist 
politics? (Hekman 1997, 349; italics in 
original) 
There are no easy answers to these 
questions, versions of which plague other 
identity-based social movements, including 
Afro-centric and gay and lesbian social movements. 
However, some postmodernists have developed 
complex, nuanced, and moderate postmodernisms 
which hold possibilities for nurturing 
epistemological pluralism, integrating ethical and 
political concerns into social knowledges, and 
working towards visions of a more just world. They 
see opportunities in postmodernism for a 
renaissance of morality, a rethinking of the ways 
we live together as humans that recognizes and 
embraces diversity without essentializing aspects of 
humanity or homogenizing difference (see for 
example, Ang 1997;Bauman 1991,1993 and 1995; 
Dean 1996; Felski 1997; Seidman 1996 and 1998; 
and the collected essays in Squires 1993). Seidman 
(1996) explains that the value of human studies that 
abandon foundationalism (i.e., "arguments that 
authorize particular standards and types of 
discourse as knowledge" (707)): 
...would pivot on what its discursive 
practices allow us to say and do - for 
example, the kinds of dangers or social 
stress points it can alert us to; the ways its 
social descriptions provide coherence and 
purpose to our collective lives; its 
accounts of the social sources of 
discontent and its proposed remedies; the 
usefulness of its social knowledges for 
social groups ... In short, judgments about 
the value of... [social] knowledges would 
depend less on whether they are true in the 
sense of a correspondence or coherence 
between the word and world than on their 
social purpose and consequences. A shift 
from atruth-driven, foundational scientific 
culture to a pragmatic culture would mean 
that ... [social] knowledges would be 
formed...by an engagement with public 
life.... Standards of critique or assessment 
... [would be] framed pragmatically or by 
asking after the purposes or consequences, 
the aims, and intellectual, social, and 
moral implications of a discourse or social 
practice. Critical judgments and social 
negotiations would be situational, 
provisional, or temporary and involve ad 
hoc discursive strategies. (711-13) 
Many feminist researchers are being 
pragmatic and getting on with their work in the best 
way they know how, while trying to live with the 
ambiguity and uncertainty that comes with 
embracing diversity and rejecting foundational 
claims to knowledge and truth. Many have rejected 
the "insider-outsider" dichotomy of standpoint 
epistemologies, which homogenizes and 
essentializes those on both sides of the boundary 
(Narayan 1993; Wolf 1996), and are moving from 
an identity-based epistemology to one "based on an 
engagement with one's politics of location in 
articulating partial perspectives based on 'situated 
knowledges'" (Lai 1996,188). As Lai (1996) argues 
forcefully, social science research necessarily 
reflects the social world in which it is situated and 
that a researcher's identity is not fixed or 
predetermined. The researcher's identity is situated 
in the research situation: 
...by the micropolitics of the research 
interactions and the macropolitics of 
societal inequality. To expect a researcher 
to become an insider is to demand that she 
transcend these politics, to escape the 
differences that are embedded in the 
everyday life that we examine. The 
feminist injunction for nonhierarchical 
research relations can thus only be met by 
an escape from reality - it is a search for 
positionality "outside the text" - a position 
that is pol i t ical ly irresponsible, 
e m p i r i c a l l y i m p o s s i b l e , and 
epistemologically indefensible. (197; 
italics in original) 
CONCLUSION 
In researching this paper, I have come to 
some conclusions that allow me to feel more 
comfortable with my uncertainties as a researcher. 
I recognize that there wil l always be boundaries and 
borders between the researcher and the researched, 
but that some will be wider and thicker than others. 
The researcher's job is to try to make those borders 
as thin and transparent as possible, in order to gain 
understanding of and insight into the situations and 
experiences of others. This requires empathy and 
understanding, but also a realistic assessment of the 
researcher's situatedness and limitations, the 
situatedness and power of those s/he studies, and 
the limits and possibilities of the discursive 
practices of the academic culture. The claim to truth 
of any research project will always be partial, 
changing, contextual, and historical, requiring that 
the researcher learn to live with uncertainty and 
ambiguity. But abandoning a foundational claim to 
knowledge or truth does not mean that we have no 
way of discriminating one account from another. A 
reasoned defence of a claim to truth will appeal, as 
it always has, to the interpretive conventions of 
communities of knowledge. Claims to truth will be 
judged by "how useful or interesting that way of 
looking at things is to an audience... What can you 
see that used to be invisible?" (Becker 1986). And 
for those who wish to promote social change, 
claims to truth will be judged by how much they 
contribute to building a more just society. 
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